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ELECTIONS-CALiFORNiA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION PROHIB-
ITING PERSONS CONVICTED OF INFAMOUS CRIMES FROM EXXER-
CISING VOTING PRIVILEGES HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CONSCIEN-
TIOUS OBJECTORS CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF FEDERAL
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT. Otsuka v. Hite (Cal. 1966).
Plaintiffs Otsuka and Abbott brought suit against the Los Angeles
County Registrar of Voters to compel their registration.' The reason
for defendant's denial of the plaintiffs' affidavits of registration was
plaintiffs' conviction more than twenty years ago2 for violating the
federal Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.8 Defendant's ac-
tion was in accordance with the California constitutional provision
prohibiting the exercise of electoral privileges by one convicted of an
infamous crime. The trial court found that each plaintiff had acted
pursuant to his own personal objection to any form of war and thus
was a bona fide conscientious objector. Nevertheless, as a matter of
law, the plaintiffs were convicted felons, and thus ineligible to vote.
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, and plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the California Supreme Court, contending that their crimes
were not "infamous" within the meaning of article II, section I of the
California Constitution. Held, reversed: To preserve its constitution-
ality," the disfranchising provision must be limited to crimes involving
1 Plaintiffs brought their action pursuant to section 350 of the California Elections
Code, which provides the following:
If the county clerk refuses to register any qualified elector in the county, the
elector may proceed by action in the superior court to compel his registration.
In an action under this section, as many persons may join as plaintiffs as have
causes of action.
2 Plaintiff Otsuka was sentenced for a term of three years, which he served; plaintiff
Abbott served two years in the penitentiary.
3 Ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 885. Violators of this provision were punished "by im-
prisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both
such fine and imprisonment ......
4 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. In relevant part the provision provides that:
Every native citizen of the United States of America ... shall be entitled to
vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law
... provided ... no alien ineligible to citizenship, no idiot, no insane person,
no person convicted of any infamous crime, no person hereafter convicted of
the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and no person who
shall not be able to read the Constitution in the English language and write
his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this state.
(Emphasis added.)
5 ,C/al. Rptr. 251 (1965).
6 In this case, the California Supreme Court did not explicitly indicate the particular
federal constitutional provisions involved [art. I, §§ 2, 4]. However, the court did
give full discussion to constitutional problems arising from the interpretation given
artide II, section 1 of the California Constitution by the District Court of Appeal.
Among these problems was: "[Tihe fact that a state is dealing with a distinct class
and treats the members of the class equally [under the Equal Protection Clause of the
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moral corruption and dishonesty which, presumably, would deem
their perpetrator a threat to the integrity of the elective process.
Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Adv. Cal. 652, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284
(1966).
The Otsuka decision imparts a new interpretation of "infamous
crime" within the context of the voting qualification of the California
constitution. The initial California case defining "infamous crime"
within the voting context was Truchon v. Toomey.7 In Truchon, the
District Court of Appeal cited In the Matter of Westenberg,8 a habeas
corpus proceeding held to determine whether the petitioner hdtd been
convicted of an "infamous crime" necessitating indictment by a
grand jury.' The Westenberg court stated:
Crimes are infamous either by reason of their punishment or by
reason of their nature. In the first class fall all felonies, as the
punishment therefor is imprisonment in the state prison. . . .At
common law, crimes which rendered the person doing them in-
famous were treason, felony, and the crimen falsi, the latter em-
bracing not only offenses, involving falsehood, but offenses in-
juriously affecting the administration of justice. .... 10
The issues in Truchon presented a problem similar to the one in
Otsuka, namely, whether the plaintiff was convicted of an infamous
crime within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Although
more concerned with the word "convicted"" than with the phrase
"infamous crime," Truchon did hold that under article II, section 1 of
the California constitution, a felony is an infamous crime.12 The
California Supreme Court cited Truchon with approval in Stephens
14th Amendment] does not end the judicial inquiry. 'The courts must reach and deter-
mine the question whether the dassifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light
of its purpose .... .' Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Adv. Cal. 652, 661, 414 P.2d 412, 418, 51
Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966) (citing and quoting from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191 (1964)). See also notes 21 and 22 infra. In effect, the Otsuka court felt that
it was unnecessary to decide the case on a constitutional basis.
7 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (1953).
8 167 Cal. 309, 139 Pac. 674 (1914).
9 CAI.. CoNST. art. I, § 8 refers to offenses which are required to be prosecuted by
indictment. The Westenberg court stated that these offenses are capital or otherwise
infamous crimes. Id. at 319, 139 Pac. at 679.
:0 167 Cal. at 319-20, 139 Pac. at 679; see generally 17 CAL. JuR. 2d Elections §
14; PERKINs, CsumNANi LAw 14 (1957); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 31 (12th ed. 1957).
11 116 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 254 P.2d at 639; see Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1238 (1954);
see generally 25 Am. JuR. 2d Elections § 94 (1966); Holland, "Conviction" Defined,
40 CAL. S.B.J. 36 (1965); 27 So. CAL. L. REV. 327 (1954).
12 116 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 254 P.2d at 639.
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v. Toomey,'3 thus giving impetus to the definition of infamous crime
as "any felony" for purposes of disfranchisement. 4
Dissatisfied with the syllogism utilized by the District Court of
Appeal to resolve the question of whether plaintiffs' crimes were
infamous,15 the Otsuka court held that state-imposed restrictions on
the right to vote are valid only if there is a showing of a compelling
state interest in abridging such right. Furthermore, such restrictions
must be drawn with narrow specificity and be germane to one's right
to vote.10
Decisions from several jurisdictions have indicated that the "com-
pelling state interest" is to preserve the integrity of the ballot box.'
7
The widespread assumption that one convicted of an infamous crime
was morally corrupt at the time of commission gives rise to a further
assumption that he may still be morally corrupt, and hence, may
casually barter his ballot. This compelling state interest of denying
the franchise to one convicted of an infamous crime is manifested
in most state constitutions.8
13 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959).
14 Id. at 869, 338 P.2d at 184, where the court states: "Robbery of the first degree
is punishable by imprisonment in state prison and is an infamous crime." (Emphasis
added.)
15 64 Adv. Cal. at 661, 414 P.2d at 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290. The District Court of
Appeal syllogism was: The state constitution disqualifies from voting those who have
been convicted of infamous crimes. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 1. Conviction of any felony
is a conviction of an infamous crime. Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 738,
254 P.2d 638, 639 (1953). Plaintiffs have been convicted of a felony. See notes 2 and
3 supra; 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1950); see also In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200, 205 (1891);
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886) ; Falconi v. United States, 280 Fed.
766, 767 (6th Cir. 1922). Therefore, plaintiffs are disqualified from the elective process.
16 64 Adv. Cal. at 661, 414 P.2d at 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290; accord, Fort. v. Civil
Service Commission, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 337, 392 P.2d 385, 389, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629
(1964) ; see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
17 E.g., Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884) ; see State ex rel. Barrett v. Sar-
torious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943) ; Application of Marino, 23 N.J. Misc.
159, 42 A.2d 469 (1945); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377
(1934) ; 29 C.J.S. Elections § 33 (1965).
18 Forty-two state constitutions explicitly provide for disfranchisement in their con-
stitutions of persons convicted of either infamous crimes, felonies, certain specified
crimes, or a combination of the three. The various constitutional phrases and the states
which employ them are listed below:
(a) Fourteen states use the phrase "convicted of felony": Alaska, Ark.,
Conn., Del., Fla., Hawaii, Kan., La., Mo., Mont., N.C., Okla., Ore., and Tex.
(b) Ten states employ "convicted of felony" and certain specified crimes:
Ariz., Ky., Minn., Neb., Nev., N.D., S.D., Va., W.Va., and Wis.
(c) Six states prefer usage of the phrase "convicted of an infamous crime":
Ill., Ind., Iowa, Tenn., Wash., and Wyo.
(d) Six states make only certain crimes the basis for disfranchisement: Ga.,
Miss., N.H., N.J., S.C., and Utah.
(e) Five states use "convicted of an infamous crime" in conjunction with cer-
tain specified crimes: Cal., Md., N.Y., Ohio, and R.I.
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It is of particular importance that deprivation of one's electoral
right be determined with narrow specificity, not only with respect to
the plaintiffs or others convicted of felonies, but also to persons
excluded from the franchise because of other constitutional disquali-
fying provisions such as non-payment of poll taxes 9 or lack of
literacy.20 The problem with the provision confronting the Otsuka
court is that to disfranchise all felons would mean the exclusion of
many whose crimes bear no relation to preserving the integrity of the
ballot box.2' Hence, the Otsuka court concluded that "no reasonable
relation is apparent between... [the result of the lower court] and
the purpose of protecting the integrity of the elective process.
22
Thus, the California Supreme Court met the syllogism of the lower
court and effectively limited the definition of "infamous crimes" to
those offenses which threaten the purity of the ballot box.
Justice Burke, writing for the dissent, posed two provocative ques-
tions: (1) What guide lines should a registrar of voters follow in
determining whether a specified crime is within the definition of
"infamous crime" as set forth by the majority?2 3 and (2) should not
a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before instituting an
action of this type ?24
With respect to the first question raised by the dissent, the majority
stated that the problem of "guide lines" is for the court to resolve
under the procedure provided by section 350 of the California Elec-
(f) Two states use "infamous crime" and "felony" and certain specified
crimes: Ala. and Idaho.
(g) New Mexico is the only state to use both phrases, i.e., "infamous crime"
and "felony," without reference to certain specified crimes.
(h) The following states place no voter restrictions in their constitutions deal-
ing with past criminality: Colo., Me., Mass., Mich., Pa., and Vt.
'9 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see generally,
Annot., 139 A.L.R. 561 (1942).
20 E.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); see
also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
21 64 Adv. Cal. at 661, 414 P.2d at 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290, where the court in-
dicates that "since conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is itself a felony (Pen. Code,
§ 182, subd. 1), disfranchisement would automatically follow from conviction of con-
spiracy to operate a motor vehicle without a muffer (Veh. Code § 27150) or to vio-
late any other of the myriads of lesser misdemeanor statutes on the books .... "
22 Id. at 661, 414 P.2d at 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290; but see S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 6:
The following persons are disqualified from being registered or voting:
First, Persons convicted of . . . wife-beating . . . fornication, sodomy,
incest ... miscegenation ....
It would appear that the California court would consider that these bear no reasonable
relation to the elective process. 64 Adv. Cal. at 661, 414 P.2d at 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at
290.
23 64 Adv. Cal. at 667, 414 P.2d at 425, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
24 Id. at 673, 414 P.2d at 426, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
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tions Code.25 The court may view section 350 together with section
310 of the California Elections Code, which reads in part: "The
affidavit of registration shall show . . . (h) that the affiant is not
disqualified to vote by reason of a felony conviction .... " 2 Following
the cancellation of his affidavit of registration,27 it is incumbent upon
the affiant to demonstrate that he should not be disfranchised solely
because of a prior felony conviction. In essence, he must establish
to the satisfaction of the registrar that the conviction was not for a
crime that involved moral corruption or dishonesty.28 If the affiant
fails to show that his felony conviction did not involve moral turpi-
tude, he would be relegated to filing an "action in the superior court
to compel his registration," pursuant to section 350 of the California
Elections Code.20
The answer to the second question posed by the dissent, dealing
with the exhaustion of administrative remedies by plaintiffs, includes
reference to California Penal Code sections 1203.430 and 4852.01
through 4852.1731 in conjunction with section 4853.8 2 In compliance
25 Id. at 667 n.13, 414 P.2d at 422 n.13, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 294 n.13; see statute cited
note I supra.
26 The other portion of this section deals with other voter qualifications, Le., Xesi-
dence, citizenship, and ability to read the Constitution in the English language.
27 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 389.
The county clerk shall, in the first week of September in each year, examine
the records of the courts having jurisdiction in case of infamous crimes and the
embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and shall cancel the affi.
davits of registration of all voters who have been finally convicted of an in.
famous crime or of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money.
28 64 Adv. Cal. at 655, 414 P.2d at 414, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 286; see Letter From the
Office of Harold W. Kennedy, Los Angeles County Counsel, to Benjamin S. Mite, Regis.
trar of Voters, Los Angeles, May 31, 1966, p. 3.
29 Statute cited note 1 supra; 64 Adv. Cal. at 667 n.13, 414 P.2d at 426 n.13, 51
Cal. Rptr. at 294 n.13. In cases arising after Otsuka, the superior court must "determine
whether the elements of the crime are such that he who has committed it may reason.
ably be deemed to constitute a threat to the integrity of the elective process . 64
Adv. Cal. at 667, 414 P.2d at 426, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
80 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4.
Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the en.
tire period thereof, or who shall have been discharged from probation prior
to the termination of the period thereof, shall at any time thereafter be per-
mitted by the court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not
guilty; or if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set
aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case the court shall thereupon dismiss
the accusations or information against such defendant, who shall thereafter
be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or
crime of which he has been convicted. The probationer shall be informed of
this right and privilege in his probation papers ...
31 These sections provide a "Procedure For Restoration of Rights and Application
for Pardon." Section 4852.17 states in part:
Whenever a person is granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Gov.
emor, based upon a certificate of rehabilitation, the pardon shall entitle the
person to exercise thereafter all civil and political rights of citizenship, in-
cluding hut not limited to: (1) The right to vote .... (Emphasis added.)
82 CAL. PEN. CODE § 4853.
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with section 1203.4, a felon may be restored to voter eligibility upon
satisfactory completion of probation.13 Likewise, if sections 4852.01
through 4852.17 are employed, one may regain his elective status
upon completion of rehabilitation proceedings." While recognizing
the availability of statutory or administrative processes as a means
of restoring one to his full rights of citizenship,3 the Otsuka majority
declared that:
[T]his procedural deficiency [failure to exhaust administrative
procedure] should not bar plaintiffs from challenging the constitu-
tionality of the underlying classification: i.e., if in the first place
it was unconstitutional to deprive them of their right to vote on
the ground here in issue, it should be immaterial that they did not
thereafter apply for restoration of that right by act of executive
clemency.3
0
By redefining "infamous crime" in terms of a "compelling state
interest" to preserve ballot box integrity, the California Supreme
Court has declared that not all felonies are crimes of infamy. Such
redefinition has the effect of gauging the infamy of a crime by its
nature rather than by its punishment.37 Although still a definite
minority, s this redefirlition of "infamous crime" would seem to
produce a better result.3 9 Unfortunately, the criterion of infamy as
presented by this court requires further clarification. It would seem
that either a judicial or legislative specification of the various crimes
meeting the Otsuka definition of "infamous" is in order.
HOWARD LEE HALM
In all cases in which a full pardon has been granted by the Governor of this
State or will hereafter be granted by said Governor to a person convicted of
an offense to which said pardon applies, it shall operate to restore to such
convicted person, all the rights, privileges, and franchises of which he has
been deprived in consequence of said conviction or by any reason of any mat-
ter involved therein .
3 Statute cited note 30 supra; Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d
638 (1953); see also Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959).
34 Statutes cited notes 31 and 32 supra; 64 Adv. Cal. at 673, 414 P.2d at 426, 51
Cal. Rptr. at 298.
35 64 Adv. Cal. at 661, 414 P.2d at 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
36 Ibid. The Otsuka court stated that "it was unconstitutional to deprive [plaintiffs]
. of their right to vote .... " (Emphasis added.) It should be reiterated that, al-
though there were constitutional problems, the court felt that a redefinition of "in-
famous crime," made in light of the purpose of article II, section 1 of the California
Constitution, would eliminate the need to decide the case on constitutional grounds.
See note 6 supra.
37 Contra, In the Matter of Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 319, 139 Pac. 674, 679.
38 PERKiNs, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1957).
39 Ibid.
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